The Issue of Nationalism

Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani was born in 1838 and passed away in 1897. He became a symbol of the ideology that began with the support of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid, which came to be known as Pan-Islamism (Ittihad-e-Islami). During Afghani’s time, nearly the entire Muslim world had fallen under the political subjugation of British and French colonial powers. He rose to challenge this Western domination. To strengthen his mission, he formulated the idea of Islamic unity. According to him, all Muslims around the world—whether living in Muslim-majority or minority regions—constituted a single Ummah. He believed they were all bound together in one political unity.

Sayyid Abul A‘la Maududi, in line with this view, stated that Muslims across the globe should be seen as an international party. Ayatollah Khomeini and other leaders popularized the term al-Ummah, which quickly gained acceptance among Muslims worldwide. The Urdu Poet Muhammad Iqbal articulated this same idea in his famous couplet:

Let Muslims be united in guarding the Sacred Sanctuary,

From the shores of the Nile to the deserts of Kashgar.

This transnational vision did not appear to conflict with the circumstances of the colonial era. At that time, much of the world was governed under a single political order, and almost all Muslims were subjects of it. However, when colonial rule collapsed and the era of nationalism emerged, the world was divided into many distinct political entities. Previously, the issue was loyalty to a single empire—now it became loyalty to over a hundred separate national units.

As noted in the Encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 7, p. 719):

“Pan-Islamism was the dominant ideology of the Muslim world in Wthe 19th century, prior to the rise of Nationalism.”

After the Second World War, as the global political landscape changed, Muslims found themselves facing an intellectually complex situation. Those who had once defined their political identity within a global Islamic framework were now compelled to reorient themselves within local nationalist structures.

At that pivotal moment, to the best of my knowledge, only one scholar in the entire Muslim world made a serious attempt to respond to this challenge: Maulana Sayyid Hussain Ahmad Madani (1879–1957). During the intense political climate before 1947, he made the bold and timely declaration:

“In our time, nations are formed on the basis of homeland.” (Nazariyah-e-Qaumiyyat, Maktaba Danish, Mazang, Lahore, p. 22)

This was undoubtedly an instance of ijtihad-based guidance. Unfortunately, the scholars of Deoband later reversed this position. They argued that his statement on the matter constituted a mere khabar (informal observation or report), rather than an insha’ (formal legal declaration).

This is no simple matter, but rather is one of extreme delicacy. It calls for careful reflection in the most impartial and objective manner.

Based on the previously stated position, the ideological view is that Islam is the nationality of all Muslims worldwide. In other words, Muslims’ political loyalty has traditionally been closely tied to their religion. However, as national identity in most countries is now defined by territorial homeland, this religious-political ideology comes into conflict with modern local realities around the world.

For instance, in modern states like the United States, the United Kingdom, or India, the prevailing concept of nationalism requires that Muslims living there show exclusive political loyalty to their homeland, with no extra-territorial allegiance. In contrast, the ideology of al-Ummah asserts that Muslims’ loyalty should lie with international Islam, not with their respective nation-states.

This contradiction has led to widespread suspicion about the national loyalty of Muslims in every country where they live as a minority.

This is a serious and complex issue. From a purely ideological perspective, Muslims face two choices:

First, they might opt to stick firmly to their stated position—that they belong to a global Islamic nation and do not subscribe to local nationalism—then, they must be prepared to accept all resulting consequences. For example, if a country refuses to admit them into the military, excludes them from the foreign service, denies them diplomatic posts, or treats them as second-class citizens due to doubts about their loyalty, they should accept these outcomes as a natural cost of their belief.

Second, Muslims choose to declare openly that the concept of al-Ummah as a political ideology was the personal opinion of certain Muslim leaders, adopted in reaction to specific historical contexts, and that it was mistakenly framed as a religious doctrine. They can then publicly reject this ideology and, as Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani once declared, affirm that:

‘While Muslims across the world are united in faith, their national identity (nationality) is determined by their homeland, not by religion.’

If Muslims clearly announce this position, the contradiction will be resolved, and their national loyalty will no longer be in doubt.

However, if Muslims choose neither option—if they remain silent on the matter, yet begin actively participating in the material and political life of their respective countries—then they are undoubtedly adopting a double standard.

That is, silently altering their practical behaviour without openly reviewing their ideological stance. Such conduct is not principled—it is opportunistic and motivated by convenience rather than conviction.

Adopting such a dual approach is not a trivial matter. It has serious consequences. It will lead to the loss of principled character among Muslims. Their spiritual development will stagnate. Their intellectual process will stall. They will be deprived of the opportunity to evolve as complete human beings. They will say, ‘We feel cut off from the deep spiritual joy that the Quran refers to as an increase in faith’ (Quran, 48:4).

Ultimately, this condition will lead to intellectual stagnation. Muslims will no longer be able to make significant contributions to global knowledge and thought.

The Quran states that every prophet’s community was given a distinct Shariah (divine law) and a clear path (minhaj) from God (Quran, 5:48). Although this appears to refer to differences between communities, the real intent is to highlight differences based on time periods. That is, the people of each era were given a Shariah and minhaj suited to the specific conditions of their time.

This is precisely why a well-established legal principle in Islamic jurisprudence holds that:

“Legal rulings change with the change of time and place.” (I‘lam al-Muwaqqi‘in by Ibn al-Qayyim, Vol. 3, p. 11; Al-Majalla Al-Ahkam
Al-Adaliyyah: 39)

This principle of divine legislation (tashri‘) was not limited to the communities before the Prophet Muhammad. It remains equally relevant for his Ummah even after the finality of prophethood. The only difference is that earlier communities received this legislative guidance directly from their prophets, whereas, after the seal of prophethood, this task of legal adaptation and renewal is to be undertaken through the ijtihad (independent reasoning) of scholars.

In light of this legislative principle, it is entirely appropriate to say that the contemporary global concept of nationality, which has now become widely accepted and established across the world, should serve as the basis for a renewed ijtihad in determining the Islamic position on the matter. And that revised position is precisely what Maulana Sayyid Hussain Ahmad Madani had announced during the pre-1947 political period.

According to this legal-religious perspective, while Muslims today are undoubtedly united in belief and religion, their national identity (nationality) should be determined by their country of residence. That is, the nationality of Muslims in any given country is the same as that of other groups living in that country. (Al-Risala, December 2003)