Missing the Real Task
Today, the leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami appear to be actively involved in various community affairs: participating in educational conferences, proposing ideas in Muslim conventions, organizing relief work during communal riots, attempting to launch an English-language newspaper for Muslims, issuing statements and “interviews” on national and international issues. However, these activities do not truly stem from an intellectual foundation. There are other reasons behind them, which is why these activities lack the genuine spirit that should be present in religious service.
1. The primary reason for this new trend in Jamaat-e-Islami’s history is that, according to its ideology, its members are naturally inclined to seek “political” types of work. Due to the specific circumstances in Pakistan after the Partition, the Jamaat. there found such work, which provided it with a support base. However, the situation in India was different, and no similar work could be identified. This led the members of the movement in India to experience stagnation and apathy. To counter this, a campaign for “mental development and purification of the heart” was initiated. The policy of the Jamaat dictated that “in principle, most of our efforts should be devoted to internal training, but the current circumstances have further increased its importance.” Consequently, out of the three divisions in the issues related to the “movement and the Jamaat,” the highest priority and at least half of the resources were allocated to internal matters, leading to a nationwide program for training and spiritual purification.
However, after a short period, it became clear that this effort was not yielding significant results. The internal decline in members, which this program aimed to curb, showed no signs of improvement.
During this period, many within the Jamaat argued that the approach to training was similar to that of khanqahi (spiritual retreat-based) training and that it would not instill any life within the Jamaat. They claimed it was like “feeding grass to a lion in an attempt to make it strong,” which could never succeed. The correct way to instill life in the Jamaat, they asserted, was to create a revolutionary, action-oriented program. They argued that, being a revolutionary group, the Jamaat could only be energized by a revolutionary program. This new thought gradually emerged from the failure of the previous approach. Some leaders of the Jamaat, while not entirely convinced by this idea, saw no other solution given the prevailing mindset of the members under their care. Consequently, this shift led the Jamaat to turn towards practical and urgent tasks.
Since it had limited opportunities to participate in general national politics, the Jamaat found some “practical tasks” within Muslim politics that could keep its members engaged. As a result, what the previous training program failed to accomplish now appeared to be happening. Ever since these “practical tasks” were initiated, a new wave of life has emerged within the Jamaat. Its leaders have gained newfound confidence. However, this renewed energy does not signify an increased connection to Allah, improved prayers, or a deeper inclination towards the Creator. Rather, it is a form of organizational vitality—and, therefore, inherently temporary. I have no doubt that the leaders who are pleased with this quick solution will not be able to celebrate for long. A slight turn of events could easily overturn this entire structure, revealing an even more frightening form of the internal decline they had merely concealed under temporary measures.
2. The second reason, which appears to have subtly infiltrated life in the Jamaat, is that the Jamaat has been unable to fulfill the objectives it set for itself. Consequently, the sense of failure has driven it to find simpler tasks to satisfy its psychological need for achievement. After the Partition, the Jamaat devised a structured plan for itself with four primary components: the end of national conflict, widespread dissemination of religious knowledge among Muslims, moral, social, and cultural reform to such an extent that non-Muslim neighbours would clearly see the Muslim society as superior to their own, gathering as much intellectual strength of the nation around the movement, and ensuring that all members gain proficiency in writing and speaking in local languages, transferring essential Islamic literature into these languages.
In April 1947, at a gathering in Madras, the Jamaat approved this plan, and its members were told that they needed to accomplish this within the next five years:
“Your small group has an enormous task to accomplish in the next five years… a task no less daunting than bringing forth streams of milk from a mountain… You must redirect Muslim public opinion and its national attitude. You must bring about doctrinal, moral, and cultural reform among the general Muslim population. You must penetrate the educated classes of Muslims and prevent them from falling into intellectual and practical disarray, guiding them instead toward the path of Islamic revolution. You must make arrangements to publish Islamic literature in the languages of different parts of the country.”
This was the mission for which the Jamaat members were instructed to dedicate all their collective strength with total focus. I do not intend to debate the five-year time frame here, as such estimates are usually inaccurate. However, in a situation where none of these tasks have yet been accomplished, it was incumbent upon the Jamaat to continue striving with full force to complete them. But the strength to “bring forth streams of milk from a mountain” was no longer present.
On the other hand, the absence of a dedicated Muslim organization created an opportunity for anyone willing to raise slogans that appealed to Muslim sentiments to gain immediate support. After the Partition, with the decline of the Muslim League in India, a leadership vacuum appeared within the Muslim community. Reflecting on how Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind sought to fill this vacant role, Maulana Abul Lais Islahi, the then Ameer of Jamat Islami Hind, once remarked:
“These people, seeing the field empty, are running at full speed.”
Today, these very words have come back to apply to Jamaat-e-Islami, which now seems actively engaged in taking up the mantle of Muslim leadership following the failure of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind to fill this role.
3. Another reason for this shift is the influence of mainstream Muslim politics. For a long time, the Jamaat had been the target of criticism from Muslims, who argued that it did nothing for them, took no part in solving their practical issues, and was instead pursuing an idealistic goal of establishing an Islamic system. These criticisms gradually went beyond mere complaints and led to a significant decline in Muslims’ interest in the Jamaat. This situation gradually impacted the Jamaat, and it has now reached the point where it has turned toward the very path it had consciously decided to avoid at the outset.
