EXPLANATION OF DISAGREEMENTS
The Quran says: “Do they not ponder on the Quran? If it had been from anyone other than God, they would have found much inconsistency in it.” (4:82)
This makes it clear that the religion of Islam, as sent by God, is a religion in which there is no contradiction. The same idea is expressed in a hadith in the following words: “I have left you on a clear path; its nights are as bright as its days.” (Sunan Ibn Majah, Hadith No. 5)
However, when a person reads the commentaries on the Quran and the explanations of Hadith, when they look into books of jurisprudence and belief, they encounter what appears to be the exact opposite. They find so many differences that it may seem as though there is hardly a single teaching in Islam on which scholars do not have multiple opinions. Islam, in such a situation, begins to appear to be a religion full of differences.
A hadith teacher from a seminary said that the lessons on hadith begin in the month of Shawwal and end in Rajab. During these ten months, not a single day passes without the need to say at least twenty times: “In this issue, such-and-such Muslim scholars have one view, and such-and-such Muslim scholars have another view.” This was the view of one companion; among the successors there are further differences”—and also to say: Our opinion is correct, and the opinion of others is wrong (Ra’yuna sawab wa ra’y ghayrina khata’ ).
Why did a religion without differences turn into one filled with differences? And what is the satisfactory explanation for this? Much has been written and said about this issue over the past thousand years. Even today, numerous articles and books continue to be published on the subject.
This question existed in a basic form even during the time of the companions. However, it became more structured during the period of the successors and their followers. When the hadiths were collected, it became evident that there were many differences among them. At that point, people began asking: Which narration should be followed, and which should not?
At the time, the initial view was that these different narrations had come from the companions themselves. And since all companions were considered worthy of being followed, how could one say: accept this companion’s narration and reject that one?
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sairafi reports that he asked Ahmad ibn Hanbal, “If the Companions of the Prophet of Islam differed on an issue, is it permissible for us to reflect and decide which of their views is correct?” He replied, “It is not permissible to deliberate between the companions of the Prophet of Islam.” Al-Sairafi then asked, “Then whose opinion should be followed?” Ahmad ibn Hanbal said, “You may follow whichever of them you wish.” (Jami‘ Bayan al- ‘Ilm wa Fadlihi by Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr: 1705)
This statement by Ahmad ibn Hanbal is, in itself, quite sound—because we cannot declare one Companion correct and another incorrect. For us, every Companion is worthy of being followed. However, this response does not provide a scholarly explanation for why this approach is valid.
After that, there is another view held by a number of jurists. For instance, Malik bin Anas was asked what should be done when there are differences among the Companions. He replied, “Some are incorrect and some are correct, so examine them and choose accordingly.” (Jami‘ Bayan al-’Ilm wa Fadlihi: 1694)
Abu Hanifah, the renowned Muslim scholar, expressed the same point in even clearer terms. He said, “One of the two opinions is wrong, and the sin for that error is forgiven.” (Jami‘ Bayan al-‘Ilm wa Fadlihi by Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr: 1706)
This answer is undoubtedly incorrect. Because if each of the differing views is attributed to a Companion, then we do not have the right to independently declare one view correct and the other wrong. In the case of differing opinions among the Companions, we are required to consider one view as correct—but drawing a distinction between them would mean going beyond our limits.
If we examine this matter more closely, we find that religion consists of two parts: one part concerns fundamentals, and the other concerns branches and details. All the differences mentioned above relate to branches and details. As for the fundamentals, there is no disagreement. For example, all Muslims agree on the five daily prayers and the number of units in each. However, there are many issues, such as saying Ameen aloud or quietly, in which differences exist.
If we look at this division in the light of the Quran, the matter becomes much easier to understand. The Quran states that all prophets were given the same al-din (42:13). Al-din refers to the core and essential teachings of religion. These fundamental teachings are eternal and were given equally to every prophet. There is no difference among them in this regard.
According to the Quran, the second part of religion is what is referred to as shir‘ah and minhaj (5:48). This second part has varied among different prophets.
The same distinction is also found internally within Islam. In other words, the agreed-upon parts of the Quran—and likewise of the Hadith—represent al-din. The remaining elements, where differences are found, belong to that part of religion that the Quran refers to as shir‘ah and minhaj.
From this, it becomes clear that according to the very scheme of the Lawgiver, one part of religion requires strict adherence, while another part allows for diversity and flexibility. This is entirely natural. It can be understood in this way: the foundational aspects of religion (such as sincerity to God) represent its spirit, while jurisprudential rulings represent its form. And it is a law of nature that the spirit always remains uniform, whereas form is never completely uniform—nor can it ever be.
For example, the essential function of a house is to provide shelter. In this sense, every house is the same. But in terms of form, no two houses can be exactly alike. Similarly, religion, in its spirit, remains the same at all times. But in terms of form, it contains variation—and this variation will never cease. This is the true explanation behind the differences among the companions.
But the matter does not end there. In fact, difference of opinion has a great positive value. That value is that when room for differing views exists, it stimulates intellectual activity—and through this process, human thought continues to develop. If there were no scope for disagreement, intellectual effort would cease, and as a result, the progress of human thought would come to a halt. That would eventually lead to mental stagnation—and mental stagnation is no different from intellectual death in this world.
During this process, differences are bound to arise. One scholar may reach one opinion, another may arrive at a different one, and a third at yet another. But differing views are not in themselves a problem. What really matters is that this is the only way through which intellectual activity continues within a group. And through such intellectual activity, creativity is born and pathways of intellectual progress open up. In this context, disagreement is the natural course, while intellectual activity is the result—and the result is what truly matters, not the course itself.
Let us take an example of this. In one part of the Quran, there is the command: “So ignore them, and put your trust in God. God is sufficient as a trustee.” (4:81) In another place, the Quran says: “O Prophet, strive against those who deny the truth and the hypocrites.”(9:73)
These two verses appear to be different. One verse instructs avoidance of certain people, while the other commands confrontation with the same group. This difference caused people to reflect, and they began thinking deeply about it.
One interpretation was that the verse about fighting had abrogated the verse about avoidance: “Turn away from them”—meaning, do not punish them. It was said that this was abrogated by the verse: “O Prophet, strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites” (Tafsir al-Qurtubi Vol. 5, p. 290).
But the intellectual process did not end there. This line of thinking further stimulated the minds of others. Upon deeper reflection, they concluded that the verse about avoidance had not been abrogated. As a result, they included it among the definitive verses (muhkamat) (Tafsir al-Qurtubi Vol. 10, p. 202).
Now if we reflect further, this second opinion appears to be more in line with the spirit of the Quran. The fact is that avoidance is a permanent instruction, and it relates to the general ethics of a believer. While giving a message, dealing with people, or traveling, it often happens that unpleasant experiences come from others. In all such situations, adopting the method of avoidance is a lasting instruction. By turning away from the ignorant, the believer demonstrates noble character, which serves as the foundation for all success in both this world and the hereafter.
As for qital (meaning physical combat), it is permitted for defensive purposes. When a group commits an act of aggression, then confrontation is allowed to repel that aggression. Combat is a temporary instruction, while avoidance is a permanent one.
This shows that there is no difference in al-din. The differences that exist are only in the shari‘ah. These differences are of two kinds: one that relates to acts of worship, and another that relates to social dealings.
The differences in worship are all related to its outward details. Such variation is entirely natural, because worship is an act that cannot always be carried out with the same internal state. Sometimes a person may have deeper feelings, and sometimes less. These internal differences create variation in the outward aspects of worship. So, while there is unity in the core elements of worship, there is diversity and flexibility in the outward practices. The differences found in narrations on worship are essentially a record of this variation.
This is also the case, in another sense, with social dealings. Although the basic rules in such matters are very clear, the circumstances in which those rules are applied are always changing. Because of this, adjustments often have to be made in the secondary and detailed applications of those rules. The differences found in hadith and jurisprudence on matters of social interaction are examples of this variation in application.
